Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified? by Mary Amiti & Shang-Jin Wei
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









This paper was prepared for the October 2004 Panel Meeting of Economic Policy in Amsterdam. The authors
wish to thank Peter Clark, Tito Cordella, Aart Kraay, and Raghuram G. Rajan for helpful comments, and
Piyush Chandra, Autria Mazda and Li Zeng for excellent research assistance. The views in the paper are
those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF or its policies.The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2004 by Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified?
Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei
NBER Working Paper No. 10808
September 2004
JEL No. F1, F2
ABSTRACT
The recent media and political attention on service outsourcing from developed to developing
countries gives the impression that outsourcing is exploding. As a result, workers in industrial
countries are anxious about job losses. This paper aims to establish what are the hypes and what are
the facts. The results show that although service outsourcing has been steadily increasing it is still
very low, and that in the United States and many other industrial countries "insourcing" is greater
than outsourcing. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, we find that job growth at a sectoral
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Outsourcing of services has received an enormous amount of attention in the media and 
political circles in recent times. In just five months, between January and May 2004, there were 
2,634 reports in US newspapers on service outsourcing, mostly focusing on the fear of job 
losses.
1 In particular, there have been reports about jobs moving from industrial countries like 
the United States and the United Kingdom to developing countries such as India. These 
concerns are not limited to the United States. Similar reports appeared in newspapers in other 
industrial countries such as the United Kingdom, which had 380 reports on outsourcing in its 
newspapers during the same period. Newspapers in Australia have also published similar 
reports. Figure 1 plots a quarterly count of news stories or commentaries in major newspapers 
and newswire service reports on international service outsourcing from the first quarter  of 1991 
to the first quarter of 2004 in the United States and the United Kingdom, which we have 
constructed using an electronic database on newspaper articles (FACTIVA). Both indexes show   
a clear upward trend in media interest in international outsourcing of services.
2 
 
All this media hype would lead one to believe that service outsourcing is some new 
phenomenon that has exploded. What has stirred such an interest in outsourcing? Many people 
would argue that outsourcing is indeed just a normal part of international trade, whereas others 
see it as something different. To date, there is not even agreement on what the term outsourcing 
means. The American Heritage Dictionary defines it as “The procuring of services or 
products...from an outside supplier or manufacturer in order to cut costs." Some people interpret 
“outside” to mean outside the firm, and others outside the country. Both usages are common.  
But since the main concerns in industrial countries are with “exporting jobs” to developing 
countries, we will restrict our attention to international outsourcing. We delve further into the 
meaning and origins of outsourcing in the next section. 
 
What is new about outsourcing today is that it is increasingly in services. Although 
international outsourcing of material inputs is still far more quantitatively important than 
services for a typical industrialized economy, which we show below, the current wave of 
anxiety in advanced economies is mostly about international outsourcing of services. There is a 
sense in which services outsourcing is qualitatively different from material outsourcing in terms 
of the “stress effect.” In the past, the service sector was largely considered impervious to 
international competition. Accountants did not fear that someone abroad would take their high-
paying jobs, but they certainly benefited from the cheaper imported manufactured goods that 
open trade allowed. For this reason, service sector professionals were likely to have been 
staunch supporters of open trade. With the improvement in the communication technology such 
                                                 
1 During the two-week period, from March 1 to March 15, 2004, there were 270 such stories 
that simultaneously mentioned outsourcing and either job loss or unemployment in the same 
story. 
2 The index for the United States exhibits local peaks in 1996, 2000, and 2004, which are all 
presidential election years.   - 3 - 
as the internet, services can cross political borders via the airwaves. Jobs in fields ranging from 
architecture to radiology seem much more at risk. While it was possible for firms to relocate 
abroad in the past, they had to give up something—their closeness to important markets, for 
example. With the new technologies they can retain these links while also obtaining access to 
cheap, but well-trained labor. The lack of control and the worry that outsourcing could spread 
contributes to the fears of white collar workers. A study conducted by the University of 
Maryland found that, in the United States, among those with incomes over $100,000, the 
percentage actively supporting free trade slid from 57 percent in 1999 to 28 percent in January 
2004 (Rajan and Wei, 2004). 
 
Whether there is any basis for this anxiety has not been carefully examined. Besides 
newspaper articles, which are largely based on management consultant reports, there is very 
little empirical research on service outsourcing. We present an overview of the literature in 
Section III. The growth of service outsourcing and its effects deserve closer attention for a 
number of reasons. First, there does appear to be a backslide in support for free trade policies, 
particularly among white-collar workers. Even if there were no evidence of job losses arising 
from outsourcing, the fear itself of losing one’s job is of concern. These kinds of fears lead to 
lobbying for protectionist type policies. For example, in Australia there were news reports of 
lobbies by Australian software companies to restrict (other) Australian firms’ ability to 
outsource software designs to India. In the United States, the Senate passed restrictions on 
foreign outsourcing for federal contracts in March 2004 (though it did not become law). Trade 
and Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt stated that the United Kingdom will not pass 
protectionist legislation (see Financial Times, 5/3/2004, page 6). If support for protectionist 
policies increases, then this may not continue to be their stance. In addition, even though we 
may expect service outsourcing to lead to long-run benefits, there may be short-term adjustment 
costs in the form of job losses. Many theoretical trade models assume full employment and 
perfect factor mobility between sectors, but rigidities in the labor market can lead to short-term 
employment effects. It is important, therefore, to assess how large these effects are in order to 
inform the policy debate on possible relocation assistance programs.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate and to establish what are the hypes and 
what are the facts about service outsourcing. First, we develop a set of stylized facts describing 
the trends in service outsourcing, which we present in Section IV. We focus on business 
services and the computing and information service trade as these most closely reflect the 
service categories that are generally thought of as being outsourced. Some of our results correct 
some misleading impressions that one may derive from the news media, while others 
complement them. We examine the following questions: Has service outsourcing exploded in 
recent years? How does it compare with the level of material outsourcing? Who are the biggest 
outsourcers of services? Who are the biggest recipients of service outsourcing from the rest of 
the world (the “insourcers”)? And are there big job losses arising from service outsourcing?  
 
A number of interesting results emerge. We show that service outsourcing has been 
steadily increasing but is still at very low levels. For example, in the United States, imports of 
computing and business services as a share of GDP were only 0.4 percent in 2003. This share   
has roughly doubled each decade—from 0.1 percent in 1983 to 0.2 percent in 1993, and to        - 4 - 
0.4 percent in 2003, based on IMF’s balance of payments trade data. A similar picture emerges 
from industry level outsourcing intensity ratios, which we constructed using input/output 
coefficients. These show that material outsourcing is at much higher levels than service 
outsourcing. 
 
Interestingly, in the United States and in many other industrial countries, exports of 
these services are greater than imports. The United States has a net surplus in services and this 
surplus has been increasing in recent years. This highlights that trade in services, like trade in 
goods, is a two-way street. In value terms the United States is the largest importer and exporter 
of combined computing and business services. However, when scaled by GDP, the proportion 
of outsourcing-type trade in the United States is low compared with the rest of the world. Based 
on 2002 figures, its share of imports of business services as a proportion of its GDP ranks 117
th 
in the world, with the United Kingdom ranking 85
th. In comparison, China, which ranked 99
th in 
the world, is ahead of the United States. The countries with the highest ratio of imports of 
business services to GDP are Angola, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique, and Ireland. 
 
The second main contribution of the paper is provided in Section V, where we analyze 
the effects of service and material outsourcing on employment, using the United Kingdom as a 
case study. We find there is no evidence that outsourcing led to employment losses in the 
United Kingdom during the period 1995 to 2001 in either the manufacturing to the services 
sectors. In section VI we present our conclusions. 
 
II.   WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
The use of the term outsourcing has not been standardized. Outsourcing generally refers 
to the procuring of material inputs or services by a firm from outside the firm. Outsourcing can 
be domestic or international. Examples of domestic outsourcing would include, say, a Detroit-
based automobile company that contracts out the production of some of its parts to a firm in 
Cleveland, Ohio; or if the auto firm contracts out its employee food service to a local restaurant 
which in turn provides the service on the site of the auto firm. Issues relating to domestic 
outsourcing have not featured prominently in the media. The main concern in the public debate 
is mostly about international outsourcing, particularly the outsourcing by firms in advanced 
economies to firms located in low-wage countries. 
 
In this paper, we focus on international outsourcing, defined as the procuring of service 
or material inputs by a firm from a source in a foreign country. This term includes both intra-
firm international outsourcing (by which the foreign provider of the input is still owned by the 
firm) and arm’s-length international outsourcing (by which the foreign provider of the input is 
independent from the firm using the input). International outsourcing is part of a country’s 
imports (of goods and services).  
 
Interestingly, the earliest use of the word “outsource” that we have traced appears to 
refer to international outsourcing of services. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(http://dictionary.oed.com), the earliest use was about the British auto industry contracting out 
engineering design work to Germany and appeared in an article in 1979 in the Journal of Royal   - 5 - 
Society of Arts, Vol. CXXVII, 141/1.
3, 4 For whatever reason, many other early uses of the terms 
“outsource” and “outsourcing” also tend to be related to the automobile industry, though they 
could refer to material inputs as well as services. The earliest use of the terms in the United 
States that can be traced electronically, according to FACTIVA, appeared in the Harvard 
Business Review in 1980, and in a major U.S. newspaper in 1981.  
 
Another commonly used word for outsourcing is offshoring. The word “offshore” has a 
long history and can be traced at least to 1895, according to the on-line version of Oxford 
English Dictionary. It means “moving away from the shore” or “foreign.” Using “offshoring” to 
refer to international outsourcing in the way we have defined above has a much shorter history.  
 
  The word “insourcing” was once used to refer to the production of something inside a 
company that it used to contract out.
5 In this paper, we define it as outsourcing in the opposite 
direction (from foreign-located firms to domestic firms). For example, the phrase U.S. 
“insourcing” refers to the outsourcing from the rest of the world to the United States. 
 
III.   RELATED LITERATURE 
This section reviews the literature on  outsourcing. It starts with a discussion of 
empirical studies on material and service outsourcing, and then moves on to the relevant 
theoretical models. 
A.   Empirical 
In the empirical literature, while there is a large set of papers on material input 





                                                 
3 The original sentence stated: “We are so short of professional engineers in the motor industry 
that we are having to outsource design work to Germany.” 
4 There are interesting historical examples of outsourcing much earlier than 1979, for example 
when the British military used German mercenaries to fight U.S. revolutionaries, but our focus 
here is on outsourcing services related to the production process. 
5 The earliest use that we have traced (using FACTIVA) appeared in an article by Dale Buss in 
the July 20, 1984 issue of the Wall Street Journal, “Whether Ford, GM Keep Small-Car Output 
in U.S. May Hinge on Firms’ Labor Talks.” The original sentence reads, “… Ford’s Mr. Pestillo 
says that the company could eventually become efficient enough to ‘insource’ production of 
such things as manual transmissions, which it currently purchases from the outside.” Note that, 
as in the case of early uses of “outsourcing,” this term was also used in association with the auto 
industry.   - 6 - 
Material Outsourcing 
 
A number of papers have studied the evolution of material outsourcing in the United 
States and other member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). For example, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Campa and Goldberg 
(1997), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Yeats (2001), Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2004), 
and Borga and Zeile (2004). Generally, these studies found a steady increase in the extent of 
international outsourcing of material inputs (measured in different ways by different authors) 
over time. For example, Yeats (2001) estimates that 30 percent of OECD exports of machinery 
and transport equipment comprised parts and components in 1995, and 26 percent in 1978. This 
share is the highest for the United States and increased from 36 percent in 1978 to  40 percent in 
1995; in Europe it increased from 26 percent to 28 percent; and in Japan from     15 percent to 
26 percent. However, when looking at the share of components imported in apparent 
consumption of transport and machinery for 1995, the EU shows the highest share at 16 
compared to 11 percent in the United States and 8 percent in Japan. 
 
In addition to examining the magnitude and trends in material outsourcing, the literature 
has studied their effects on productivity and the wage skill premium. Egger and Egger (2001) 
find that there is a negative effect of international material outsourcing on the productivity of 
low-skilled workers in the short run, but a positive effect in the long run. They found that 
international outsourcing of materials contributed to 3.3 percent of real value added per low-
skilled worker in the EU from 1993 to 1997. They attribute the negative short-run effect to 
imperfections in the EU labor and goods markets.  
 
Several papers have studied the effect of international outsourcing of material inputs on 
the wage skill premium. By relocating the unskilled-intensive parts of the production process 
from relatively skill abundant countries to unskilled-abundant countries, outsourcing is expected 
to increase the relative demand for skilled labor in the skill-abundant country and hence 
increase the skill premium. Empirical evidence in the United States (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996, 1999) and the United Kingdom (Hijzen et al, 2002) confirm this finding. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) show that outsourcing contributed between 17.5 to 40 percent of the increase in 
the non-production wage share over the period 1979 to 1990. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) also 
show that liberalized foreign investment and trade led to an increase in the skill premium in 
Mexico too. The foreign assembly plants located on the border were created by U.S. firms 
outsourcing their less skill-intensive parts, which are more skill intensive relative to other 




The literature becomes much thinner when it comes to international outsourcing of 
services. Focusing on the information technology (IT) sector in the United States, Mann (2004) 
argues that globalization—specifically international outsourcing of IT hardware led to a fall of 
10 to 30 percent in prices of IT hardware, which translated into higher productivities in all 
sectors that use IT hardware.  Mann then argues that IT software—a form of international 
outsourcing of services—should be expected to benefit the economy in the same way as IT   - 7 - 
hardware. Furthermore, if one assumes that IT software is more price elastic than IT hardware, 
then the expected productivity gains could be even higher. Finally, Mann documented that IT 
industries had exhibited a high job growth, so the international outsourcing does not appear to 
hurt job growth in that sector. 
 
Amiti and Wei (2004), using data on all manufacturing industries in the United States, 
find that service outsourcing is positively correlated with labor productivity in the United States 
but material outsourcing is insignificant. Gorg and Hanley (2003) show that international 
outsourcing of services had a positive impact on productivity in the electronics industry in 
Ireland between 1990 and 1995. They also found that outsourcing of tangible inputs did not 
have a significant effect on productivity during this period. Girma and Gorg (2003) find positive 
evidence of service outsourcing on labor productivity and total factor productivity in the United 
Kingdom between 1980 and 1992, but they are unable to distinguish between domestic and 
foreign outsourcing. 
 
Studies on service outsourcing and employment effects have mainly been conducted by 
management consultants. For example, McKinsey Global Institute’s report (2003) is a widely 
quoted study on service outsourcing. It makes a prediction on job loss due to outsourcing from 
2003 to 2015 and computes the distribution of gains between the country that does the 
outsourcing and the one that receives the outsourcing. The underlying methodology used to 
make the calculations is not entirely transparent in the report, making it difficult to assign 
standard errors to the estimates. The McKinsey report also makes the point that the amount of 
job losses due to outsourcing is a relatively trivial share of overall job losses during the normal 
course of a business cycle. Brainard and Litan (2004) provide an overview of these studies, and 
focus on the distributional effects of outsourcing, pointing out that it is the low paid jobs that are 
being replaced with higher paid jobs. They also provide a number of policy prescriptions for the 
United States. Shultze (2004) provides some indirect evidence of job losses related to service 
outsourcing and concludes that the effect is very small. 
 
A more rigorous study of the effects of service outsourcing on employment is provided 
in Amiti and Wei (2004) using U.S. data. This study also concludes that there is a small 
negative effect of service outsourcing on employment when using highly disaggregated data. 
Some details of this study are provided in Section V of this paper. 
 
B.   Theoretical 
Although there is a rich body of literature that models a firm’s decision on where to locate 
different parts of the production stage, all these models assume perfect inter-sectoral labor 
mobility so they do not make predictions on net job losses. For example, Jones and Kierzkowski 
(1990, 1991, and 2001), Dixit and Grossman (1984), Krugman and Venables (1995), Deardorff 
(1998a and b), Yi (2003) and Amiti (2004) develop models of where different parts of the 
production stage will be located. When trade costs or technological progress leads to 
international fragmentation of different parts of the production stage, firms engage in input 
trade, and this can be thought of as part of outsourcing. These are models of non-integrated 
firms, where different firms own different production stages, and hence the type of trade that   - 8 - 
takes place is referred to as arm’s-length trade. Outsourcing can also take place between 
vertically integrated firms, such as in Helpman’s (1984) model of vertical foreign direct 
investment, which is referred to as intra-firm trade.
6 Antras (2003) introduces incomplete 
contracts to study ownership decision (whether firms should own the plants producing 
intermediate inputs or not); and Antras and Helpman (2003) combine the ownership decision 
with the decision on whether intermediate input producing plants should be located abroad or 
not. In all of these models, the focus is on the outsourcing of material inputs but these could, in 
principle, be re-interpreted as service inputs. 
 
Trade economists generally assume full employment and perfect factor mobility 
between sectors within a country, for example, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, so then all the 
action is on factor prices, i.e., the net employment effects are essentially assumed away. And in 
this kind of model you do not need to have a large amount of trade to affect factor prices. All 
you need is for goods prices to change, which then affect factor prices (i.e. Samuelson–Stolper 
theorem). These international price changes can arise for many reasons.  For example, the threat 
of foreign competition in itself can drive down goods prices even if the trade does not take 
place. 
 
The H-O model is generally considered to be a long-run model, i.e., with factors 
perfectly mobile. So in this model trade can lead to sectoral employment changes as one sector 
contracts and another expands but no net job losses. In the short run, there may be rigidities that 
prevent perfect factor mobility and hence give rise to net employment effects. For example, 
Sachs and Shatz (1994) argue that any of the following factors could give rise to net 
employment losses in manufacturing: “(i) the low-wage workers have a positively sloped supply 
elasticity, so that a decline in their wage leads to a decline in labor force participation; (2) low-
wage workers are unionized, and unions maintain wages above full-employment levels; or (3) 
low-wage workers have alternative employment opportunities in non-manufacturing (such as 
services), so that they leave the manufacturing sector entirely when international competition 
puts downward pressure on wages.”  Krugman (1995) presents a H-O model with rigid factor 
prices to show how trade can give rise to big employment effects. If one were to also introduce 
frictions in inter-sectoral labor mobility then these effects would be even larger.
7  
 
                                                 
6 This slicing up of the production chain across different countries has also been referred to in 
the literature as international production sharing, globalized production, de-localization, 
fragmentation, intra-product specialization, intra-mediate trade, and offshoring. Intra-firm 
international outsourcing has also been related to vertical foreign direct investment, and vertical 
specialization. 
7 The McKinsey report indicated that more than 69 percent of workers who lost jobs due to 
imports in the United States between 1979 and 1999 were re-employed (this is based on U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data). Of course, this means that 31 per cent were not re-employed, 
highlighting that there may be some rigidities in the labor market.     - 9 - 
IV.   GLOBAL PATTERNS OF SERVICE OUTSOURCING—THE UNTOLD STORIES IN THE MEDIA 
In this section, we document a set of features about patterns of global service trade that 
have been under-reported or misreported by news media. Specifically, we aim to address the 
following questions. Is there a discreet and abrupt rise in service outsourcing in industrialized 
economies in recent years? What is the relative importance of service outsourcing versus 
material outsourcing? Who are the biggest outsourcers of services in the world? Who are the 
biggest recipients of service outsourcing from the rest of the world?  
 
  We first provide a description of the data used to measure outsourcing before moving on 
to the results. 
 
A.   Measurement of Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is generally difficult to measure because information on which parts of the 
production stage are contracted out are not readily available, so we need to rely on indirect 
measures. We construct two different types of measures of outsourcing. The first is an 
economy-wide measure based on imports of computing (which includes computer software 
designs) and other business services (which include accounting and other back-office 
operations), using data from International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook, which in turn is compiled from the reports to the IMF by the national authorities of 
member countries. This is the main data source we use to explore patterns of cross-border 
services trade. 
 
We chose to focus on trade in computing and information and other business services 
because these are the categories that most likely encompass outsourcing activities. The other 
categories, such as travel and education, are less likely to include such activities so we excluded 
them from the study. We would expect that business services should predominantly comprise 
inputs used by firms, but the computing category is likely to include a higher component of final 
consumer purchases. However,  it is impossible to specify the exactly how much of the trade is 
in final consumer services. As a robustness check, at least for the U.S. data, we compared the 
trends in the IMF statistics with those provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The BEA splits services trade by affiliates and non-affiliates. The affiliate trade is undertaken 
by multinational corporations, between parents and affiliates, so more closely reflects 
outsourcing trade. We found that the trends for affiliate trade are similar to those indicated by 
the IMF data.  
 
The second measure of service outsourcing is calculated on an industry basis for the 
United Kingdom, as Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) do for material inputs for the United 
States. For a given industry i,  its outsourced services as a share of total non-energy inputs, 
OSSi, is calculated as follows: 
   - 10 - 
imports of service input purchases of service   by industry 
*
total nonenergy inputs used by industry  production +imports -exports  
j
i




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿  
The first square bracketed term is calculated using input/output tables. The denominator 
includes all non-energy material inputs, listed in Appendix II, plus the following nine service 
industries:  telecommunications; banking and finance, insurance and pension funds, and 
auxiliary financial services; renting of machinery; computer services; research and 
development; legal activities, accountancy services, market research, and management 




The second square bracketed term is calculated using international trade data from the 
IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks. Unfortunately, imports of each input by 
industry are unavailable. As a proxy, an economy-wide import share is applied to each industry. 
To illustrate, the U.K. economy imported 20.5 percent of business services in 2001. We then 
assume that each industry (in the manufacturing and service sectors) imports 20.5 percent of the 
business services used in that year. On average, a U.K. industry uses 4.5 percent of business 
services as a proportion of total non-energy material inputs. So the outsourcing intensity of 
business services for a typical industry would be 0.205*0.045=9.2 percent. We then aggregate 
across the nine service inputs to get the average service outsourcing intensity for each industry. 
The breakdown of the two components of the outsourcing intensity ratio for each service 
category is provided for 1992 and 2001 in Table 1. 
 
An analogous measure is constructed for material outsourcing for each industry i, 
denoted OSMi. In total, our sample consists of 78 industries (69 manufacturing industries and 9 
service industries).   
 
  A number of potential problems with our outsourcing measures should be noted. First, 
they are likely to under-estimate the value of outsourcing because the cost of importing services 
is likely to be lower than the cost of purchasing them domestically. So it would be preferable to 
have quantity data rather than current values but this is unavailable for the United Kingdom. 
Second, applying the same import share to all industries is not ideal, but given the unavailability 
of imports by industry this is our “best guess”. This strategy was used by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996, 1999) to construct measures of material outsourcing. This approach apportions a higher 
value of imported inputs to those industries that are the biggest users of those inputs. Although 
this seems reasonable, without access to actual import data by industry it is impossible to say 
how accurate it is. Third, the total use of inputs by industry only includes those inputs purchased 
                                                 
8 The three finance categories, banking and finance, insurance and pension funds, and auxiliary 
financial services are aggregated into one category to match the employment data. For the same 
reason, we aggregate the three categories legal activities, accountancy services, and market 
research and management consultancy.     - 11 - 
from a different industry so services produced within the industry are not included, hence the 
extent of outsourcing is unlikely to be precisely measured. Despite these limitations, we believe 
that combining the input use information with trade data does provide a reasonable proxy of the 
proportion of services imported from abroad.  
 
B.   Outsourcing Trends in Developed Countries 
International outsourcing of services has increased in the United States but still remains 
low, based on our economy-wide measure using IMF international trade data. Imports of 
computer and information plus other business services as a share of GDP were only 0.4 percent 
in 2003. This share has roughly doubled in each decade—from 0.1 percent in 1983 to 0.2 
percent in 1993, and to 0.4 percent in 2003. The United Kingdom has a higher outsourcing ratio 
than the United States—at 0.9 percent in 1983, 0.7 percent in 1993, and 1.2 percent in 2003. 
 
A similar picture emerges from industry level outsourcing intensity ratios, which were 
constructed using input/output coefficients. Figure 2 presents the average outsourcing intensity 
ratios across manufacturing and service industries, weighted by output. These ratios indicate 
that on average the share of service imports in the United Kingdom increased from 3.5 percent 
in 1992 to 5.5 percent in 2001. These figures are higher than those for the United States, which 
increased from 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent over the same period (see Amiti and Wei, 2004). But 
in both cases there is clearly an upward trend. 
 
Material outsourcing intensities are significantly higher than service outsourcing in both 
the United Kingdom and United States. Material outsourcing is around 27 percent in the United 
Kingdom and 12 percent in the United States. From Figure 2, we see that in the United 
Kingdom material outsourcing peaked in 1996 and has been on a downward trend since then. In 
the United States it has been steadily increasing but at a slower pace than service outsourcing. 
 
In sum, service outsourcing is much lower than material outsourcing, but it is increasing 
at a faster pace. 
 
C.   Which Countries Are the Biggest Outsourcers? 
Media reports might give the impression that outsourcing is mostly about the United 
States and other industrialized countries contracting out services to India and a few other 
developing countries. This is not entirely correct. 
 
To set the record straight, we look at the trade data in two categories of services that 
have been most intensely reported: computer and information services and other business 
services. In value terms, other business services (which we will refer to as just business 
services) are by far the larger of the two categories.  
 
Using data for 2002, the latest year for which internationally comparable data were 
available, the top outsourcers of business services in dollar amounts are United States        - 12 - 
(US$41 billion), Germany (US$39 billion), followed by a group of countries with trade 
approximately of the same order of magnitude, Japan ($25 billion), the Netherlands  
(US$21 billion), Italy (US$20 billion), France (US$19 billion), and the United Kingdom 
(US$16 billion). Interestingly, India and China—two countries that have been portrayed as 
major recipients of outsourcing in the media—are themselves significant outsourcers of 
business services (with a value of US$11 billion for India and US$8 billion for China, and 
ranked 11
th and 18
th in the world, respectively). Table 2 lists the value of imports for these 
services for selected countries with their rankings in the world.  
 
  In the categories of computer and information services (which is quantitatively an order 
of magnitude smaller than business services), the top five importers are Germany, United 
Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, and Spain. The United States is a close 6
th. China is ranked at 
10
th place. Unfortunately, there is no data from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook for India on trade in computer and information services. 
 
  Of course, larger economies naturally trade more than smaller ones. Therefore, to get a 
sense of the importance of outsourcing for a local economy, it is important to scale the value of 
imports by the size of the economy. For example, if one scales imports of business services by 
local GDP, none of the countries mentioned above would appear in the top ten list. In fact, 
smaller economies like Angola, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Ireland, and Vanuatu turn 
out to be much more outsourcing-intensive, with the ratio of imported business services to GDP 
exceeding 10 percent. In contrast, the United States has an outsourcing ratio in business services 
less than half of a percent of its GDP (ranked 117
th in the world), and the United Kingdom 
slightly over 1 percent of its GDP (ranked 85
th). As a comparison, India imports a larger amount 
of business services as a share of GDP (2.4 percent) than the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Table 3A lists the share of imports of services as a proportion of local GDP and their 
ranks. The country rankings are almost the same if one scales the value of service imports by 
local total service value-added. See Table 3B. 
 
  In sum, the notion that large industrialized countries outsource more intensely than other 
economies is not supported by the trade data. 
 
D.   Who Are the Biggest “Insourcers”? 
Like trade in goods, trade in services is a two-way street. Most countries receive 
outsourcing of services from other countries as well as outsource to other countries. In recent 
times, the word “insourcing” has been used as a shorthand for the amount of outsourcing a 
country receives from the rest of the world. We use exports of business and computing services 
as a proxy for insourcing. 
 
  Who are the biggest insourcers or the recipients of global outsourcing? In dollar terms, 
the top five recipients in 2002 are the United States (US$59 billion), the United Kingdom 
(US$37 billion), Germany (US$28 billion), France (US$21 billion), and the Netherlands    - 13 - 
(US$20 billion). India, a country that has received the most media attention as a recipient         
of outsourcing, is ranked at 6
th place (US$18.6 billion); and China is ranked at 14
th place 
(US$10 billion). It is worth emphasizing that India is one of the biggest exporters of business 
services in the world but there are five industrialized countries ahead of it. The data show that 
the top recipients of global service outsourcing tend to be rich, industrialized countries, rather 
than poor developing countries. 
  However, if one scales the value of exports by the size of local GDP, smaller economies 
turn out to be more insourcing-intensive than the larger ones. For example, from Table 5 we see 
that the top three insource-intensive economies are Vanuatu, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR, 
each with exporting services as a share of local GDP exceeding 10 percent. By this metric, India 
is somewhat more insourcing-intensive than the United Kingdom (3.8 percent of GDP vs.  
2.4 percent); and China is somewhat ahead of the United States (0.8 percent of GDP vs.          
0.6 percent). 
 
E.   Who Are the Biggest Surplus Countries? 
At this point, it is natural to consider the balance of payments implications of service 
outsourcing. Are industrialized economies more likely to run a deficit in services trade than 
developing countries? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, the largest surplus countries of 
combined computing and business services in the world are the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
 
  Figure 3 plots the time series of the US imports, exports, and the net balance of business 
services. Tables 5 and 6 rank countries in terms of exports of business services and computing, 
and net balance, respectively. We note that the United States has been running a surplus in this 
service category every year since 1980, as does the United Kingdom. They are in fact, the 
largest and the second largest surplus countries in the world, respectively. In other words, if 
every country reduced its overall service outsourcing, the United States and the United 
Kingdom would be the biggest two losers in terms of net dollars lost in service trade. The U.S. 
current account deficit would become bigger, not smaller. 
 
However, the patterns for other industrialized countries are more varied. For example, in 
business services, Germany has been running a small deficit every year throughout our sample, 
between 1980 and 2001. France had been consistently running a small surplus until the end of 
the sample when it switches to a mild deficit. There does not seem to be a consistent pattern     
of a country being in net surplus or deficit in business services solely based on the level of 
development. For example, in India, imports and exports of business services were fairly 
balanced in much of the early part of the sample. However, starting from 1996, exports have 
really taken off, surpassing imports by an ever widening margin, resulting in a reasonably large 
surplus position today. For China, the relative size of imports and exports of business services 
alternates between periods, though it ends the sample with a small surplus.  
 
  Figure 4 plots time series of imports, exports and the trade balance in computer and 
information services. The patterns are broadly similar to trade in business services, with both 
the United States and United Kingdom showing a net surplus, and China alternating between a   - 14 - 
surplus and deficit. The new feature in computing trends relative to business services is that 
Ireland is the largest surplus country in computing. 
 
  To sum up, the presumption that global service trade is dominated by lopsided one-way 
outsourcing from developed countries to developing countries is not supported by the data. If 
anything, several major industrialized countries, notably the United States and the United 
Kingdom, export more outsourcing type services than they import from the rest of the world. It 
is particularly important to note that the United States and United Kingdom are net exporters of 
services since the media seem to equate outsourcing with job losses (and insourcing with job 
gains). Of course, to assess whether there are in fact any short-term job losses arising from 
outsourcing we need a more rigorous analysis, which we turn to in the next section. 
 
V.   DOES SERVICE OUTSOURCING REDUCE JOBS? 
A factor behind the recent anxiety in advanced economies over service outsourcing is 
the fear of losing jobs at home. If labor were perfectly mobile between sectors then a job lost in 
one sector would be gained in another. However, if one adds rigidities to the labor market in a 
trade model then outsourcing could lead to net employment losses, at least in the short run. In 
this case, even a small amount of outsourcing could lead to large job losses. But outsourcing 
could also lead to job growth. On the one hand, every job lost is a job lost.
9 On the other hand, 
firms that have outsourced could and should become more efficient and expand production and 
expand employment in other lines of work.  If firms relocate their relatively inefficient parts of 
the production process to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply, they can 
expand their output in production stages for which they have comparative advantage. These 
productivity benefits can translate into lower prices generating further demand and hence create 
more jobs. This job creation effect could in principle offset the direct job losses due to 
outsourcing.  
 
  As the predictions from the theory are ambiguous, we turn to the data. We estimate the 
effects of outsourcing on employment using a common empirical specification of labor demand 
(see Hamermesh, 1993) as follows:
10 
 
  0 1 ln ln ln ln it it it it L w y a a g w d = + + +              (2) 
 where w is the wage rate, ￿ is a vector of other input prices, and y is the level of output. In 
general, an increase in the wage is expected to have a negative effect on employment demand, 
whereas an increase in the price of other inputs would lead firms to substitute away from the 
                                                 
9 Note that this would also be true for domestic outsourcing. The main difference is that the job 
lost with domestic outsourcing is necessarily gained in another sector in the domestic economy. 
But with foreign outsourcing this job is lost to a foreign country, hence the focus on 
international outsourcing. 
10 This is derived from a cost function using Shepard’s lemma.   - 15 - 
more expensive inputs toward labor. Of course, an increase in output would lead to higher 
employment. 
 
The question arises as to which input prices to use for outsourcing. If the firm is a 
multinational firm deciding on how much labor to employ at home and abroad then it should be 
the foreign wage. But not all of outsourcing takes place within multinational firms and also with 
outsourcing from many countries it is unclear which foreign wage to include, if any. Firms that 
import inputs at arm’s-length don’t care about the wages but instead are concerned about the 
price of the imported service. Since we do not have prices of imported services we use the 
outsourcing intensity as an inverse proxy of price of imported service inputs, i.e., the lower the 
price of imported service inputs the higher the outsourcing intensity. For other input prices, such 
as the rental rate on capital, we assume that all firms face the same price, which we assume is 
some function of time, r=f(t).  
 
   We take first differences of equation (2), denoted by ￿, giving the following estimating 
equation,  
 
0 1 2 3 ln ln ln ln ln ln it it it it it it t it L w OSS OSM y D a a a a b w g d e D = + D + D + + D + D + + (3) 
 
where ￿lnOSSit is the log difference in service outsourcing intensity, and ￿lnOSMit is the log 
difference of material outsourcing intensity. We also include up to two period lags of these 
variables to take account that employment effects may not be instantaneous. This first 
difference specification controls for any time-invariant industry-specific effects such as industry 
technology differences. We also include year fixed effects, Dt, to control for any unobserved 
effect common across all industries, such as changes in the cost of capital, and in some 
specifications we also include industry fixed effects.  
 
In our companion paper (Amiti and Wei, 2004), we estimate this equation using U.S. 
data, where we found the effect on jobs depends crucially on the level of disaggregation. When 
the U.S. economy was decomposed into 450 sectors, a faster growth in outsourcing at a sector 
level is associated with a small negative growth in jobs in that sector (i.e., a2<0). However, 
when the U.S. economy was decomposed into 96 sectors (still very disaggregated but less so  
than the 450-sector classification), there is no correlation between job growth and growth of 
outsourcing at the sector level. These results seem sensible. At sufficiently disaggregated levels, 
every outsourced job is a job lost. Hence, job growth and outsourcing may be negatively related. 
At the other extreme, for the economy as a whole, outsourcing is likely to change only the 
sectoral composition of the jobs, but not necessarily the aggregate level of employment. The 
interesting finding is that one does not need to aggregate the sector very much. Even when the 
U.S. economy is disaggregated into 96 sectors, one can already see enough creation of new jobs 
in the outsourcing-intensive sectors that can offset jobs lost due to outsourcing. 
 
  A nagging question is whether the results from the U.S. case are applicable to European 
and other advanced economies. Therefore, it would be useful to re-examine this question for   - 16 - 
another economy. In this section of the paper, we turn to a case study of the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom makes an interesting comparison with the United States. First, as we have 
shown at the beginning of this paper, the anxiety over service outsourcing in the United 
Kingdom is likely to be as high as in the United States, as indicated by the intensity of news 
coverage if scaled by the size of the economy. Second, the United Kingdom actually engages in 
about three times as much service outsourcing as a share of its GDP (1.2 percent in 2001) as the 




The data we use is for the United Kingdom from 1995 to 2001. It includes 69 
manufacturing industries and 9 service industries. The list of industries and details of the 
variables are provided in Appendices 1 and II.  
 
To fix ideas, we first look at some examples of sectors with the fastest and the slowest 
employment growth and their associated growth in service outsourcing. The top five and bottom 
five industries ranked by total employment growth are presented in Table 7A; and the top five 
and bottom five industries ranked by service outsourcing growth are presented in Table 7B. 
From Tables 7A and 7B, we see that no uniform pattern emerges between service outsourcing 
and employment growth. For example, the “other transport equipment” sector has the second 
highest growth in employment and one of the highest growth in service outsourcing, yet the 
“preparation and spinning of textile fibers” sector experienced negative employment growth 
over the period and was ranked one of the biggest outsourcing sectors. In contrast, both the 
“man made fiber” and the “machine tools” sectors experienced a large decline in employment 
growth, yet the “man made fiber” sector experienced high service outsourcing growth and the 
“machine tools” sector experienced a rapid decline in service outsourcing. A scatter plot of 
service outsourcing growth and employment growth for all 78 industries is presented in Figure 
5. 
 
In Tables 8 and 9, we present our results using statistical analysis to relate job growth at 
a sectoral level to the change in service outsourcing at the same disaggregated level. Tables 8A 
and 8B present the results for the manufacturing industries and Tables 9A and 9B present the 
results for the service industries. In the first column of Table 8A, we simply look at correlations 
between employment and outsourcing and the first period lag; and in the second column we add 
second period lags. In both of these specifications service outsourcing appears to have a positive 
effect on employment. In the third column we add wages and output as specified in equation 
(3). As hypothesized, wage has a significant negative effect on employment, and output has a 
significant positive effect. Even with these additional controls, service outsourcing still has a 
positive significant coefficient.  
 
However, there is some concern that taking first time differences might induce 
measurement error, particularly when the variables are aggregated at the industry level. To 
address this concern, we re-estimate the equations using two period differences, which we   - 17 - 
present in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 8A.
11 Now, we see that service outsourcing has a 
significant positive coefficient only at the 10 percent significance level, in column (4) where 
only one period lags are included, and an insignificant effect when we add second period lags in 
column (5). In column (6), where we add wages and output, the outsourcing coefficient remains 
insignificant, but wages still has the hypothesized negative sign and output has the expected 
positive sign. So the positive coefficient on service outsourcing is not robust to specifications 
with longer time differences. 
 
In Table 8B, we conduct further sensitivity analysis to determine whether there is any 
effect from service outsourcing on manufacturing employment. Again, the first three columns 
present the results with one-period time differenced variables, and the last three columns with 
two-period time differenced variables. The first column in Table 8B includes the price of output 
rather than the amount produced, in order to allow outsourcing to affect employment through 
the scale affect. For example, outsourcing of services could result in more efficient production 
and hence lower prices of output resulting in increased demand for output, which in turn 
increases derived demand for labor. Here the outsourcing coefficient is only significant at the  
10 percent level (in column 1), and insignificant in column (4) with two period differenced data. 
In columns 2 and 3, and 5 and 6 we go back to controlling for output (instead of price) and add 
a lagged dependent variable to take account of persistence. A similar picture emerges, with a 
positive significant coefficient on service outsourcing with one period differenced data, and 
barely significant in two period differenced data. 
 
As a final check, we add industry fixed effects to take account of the differences in 
unobserved industry characteristics such as differences in technology that could be driving 
employment growth. Again, the service outsourcing coefficients are significant with one period 
differenced data and insignificant with two period differenced data. 
 
The main message from Tables 8A and 8B is that outsourcing does not have a negative 
effect on manufacturing employment. The positive coefficient is not robust across 
specifications, and in none of the specifications did we see a negative coefficient. The 
insignificant effect on employment may be explained by the level of industry aggregation. For 
example, a worker may lose her job due to outsourcing but then find a job in another firm within 
the same industry classification. Then the effect would not show up in aggregate data.  
 
In Tables 9A and 9B, we present the results for the services industries. All the 
specifications are the same as for the manufacturing industries except we include nominal 
output instead of real output because service price indices were unavailable. The first two 
specifications in Table 9A that look only at partial correlations show an insignificant effect for 
both one period difference and two period difference specifications. The only specification with 
a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level is with two period differenced data in Table 
                                                 
11 Ideally, one would take longer time differences to wash out the measurement error but this 
was not possible with a short time series of seven years. See Griliches and Hausman (1986).   - 18 - 
9B, column (3) but this is a small net effect and is not robust across specifications. For example, 
once we add industry-specific effects, this effect disappears. So there does not appear to be any 
robust significant negative effect from service outsourcing on service industries.  
 
  In sum, the statistical results would appear to suggest that jobs displaced by service 
outsourcing are likely to be offset by new jobs created in the same sector.  
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In developed countries, there is a tremendous amount of anxiety over international 
outsourcing of services. The anxiety comes in part from the perception one may obtain from the 
news media that global service trade is exploding and that it is dominated by lopsided, one-way 
outsourcing from developed countries to developing countries, and that this will lead to massive 
job losses in countries such as the United States and United Kingdom. 
 
  This paper presents a body of evidence that suggest neither aspect of anxiety is well 
supported by the data. In particular, most developed countries are not particularly more 
outsourcing-intensive (when adjusted for economic size) than many developing countries. In 
any case, many developed countries tend to run surpluses—i.e., the rest of the world outsources 
more to them than the reverse—in those categories most often featured in the news media, for 
example, business services and computer and information services. In fact, the United States 
and the United Kingdom have run the largest and second largest surpluses in services trade in 
the world in recent years. 
 
  Using data on 78 sectors in the United Kingdom, we found no evidence to support the 
notion that sectors with higher growth of service outsourcing would have a slower rate of job 
growth. In our companion paper on the U.S. economy (Amiti and Wei, 2004), we find that a 
negative effect on employment can be detected if the economy is decomposed to 450 sectors, 
but the negative effect disappears when one looks at slightly broadly defined sectors (96 sectors 
in the US economy). These results suggest that service outsourcing not only would not induce a 
fall in aggregate employment, but also has the potential to make firms/sectors sufficiently more 
efficient, leading to enough job creation in the same sectors to offset the lost jobs due to 
outsourcing. 
 
  To conclude, the risk of service outsourcing dramatically reducing job growth in the 
advanced economies has been greatly exaggerated. 
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Mean Std Dev Min Max
Telecommunications 0.0153 0.0373 0.0012 0.2937 0.1360
Finance  and  Banking 0.0467 0.0322 0.0165 0.2758 0.0316
Renting  of  Machinery 0.0137 0.0099 0.0020 0.0704 0.1167
Computer  Services 0.0112 0.0185 0.0012 0.0916 0.1290
Research  and Development 0.0083 0.0314 0.0000 0.2764 0.1494
Legal,  Accountancy  and  Management  Services 0.0319 0.0533 0.0031 0.2789 0.0612
Architectural  Activities and  Technical  Consultancy 0.0235 0.0316 0.0029 0.2337 0.0808
Advertising 0.0198 0.0260 0.0000 0.1364 0.0785
Other  Business  Services 0.0291 0.0661 0.0000 0.3677 0.2153
2001
Services
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Telecommunications 0.0158 0.0393 0.0022 0.3175 0.1170
Finance  and  Banking 0.0429 0.0232 0.0073 0.1762 0.0775
Renting  of  Machinery 0.0158 0.0162 0.0016 0.1290 0.0877
Computer  Services 0.0211 0.0302 0.0027 0.1543 0.0922
Research  and Development 0.0069 0.0161 0.0000 0.1440 0.1740
Legal,  Accountancy  and  Management  Services 0.0372 0.0588 0.0020 0.2823 0.0604
Architectural  Activities and  Technical  Consultancy 0.0256 0.0287 0.0058 0.2231 0.0794
Advertising 0.0252 0.0360 0.0016 0.2250 0.0731
Other  Business  Services 0.0429 0.0978 0.0018 0.5554 0.2048
Share   of    Service
Import of Service j
Share   of    Service
Import of Service j
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Table 2.  Who Are the Biggest Absolute Outsourcers, 2002? 
1/ 
 
Rank Country Business Services Rank Country
Computer & Information 
Services
1 United States 40,929 1 Germany 6,124
2 Germany 39,113 2 United Kingdom 2,602
3 Japan 24,714 3 Japan 2,148
4 Netherlands 21,038 4 Netherlands 1,586
5 Italy 20,370 5 Spain 1,572
6 France 19,111 6 United States 1,547
9 United Kingdom 16,184 9 France 1,150
11 India 11,817 10 China, P.R. 1,133
18 China, P.R. 7,957 14 Russia 592
20 Russia 4,583




Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
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Table 3.  Who Are the Biggest Relative Outsourcers (2002)? 
1/ 
 
Rank Country Business Services Rank Country
Computer & Information 
Services
1 Angola 35.01 1 Cyprus 2.06
2 Congo, Republic of 22.33 2 Luxembourg 1.25
3 Mozambique 17.41 3 Moldova 0.71
4 Ireland 15.44 4 Belgium 0.57
5 Vanuatu 14.22 5 Guyana 0.48
44 India 2.40 13 Germany 0.31
57 Germany 1.96 29 Russia 0.17
74 France 1.33 30 United Kingdom 0.17
75 Russia 1.33 43 China, P.R.: 0.09
85 United Kingdom 1.03 48 France 0.08
99 China, P.R. 0.63 57 Japan 0.05
103 Japan 0.62 73 United States 0.01
117 United States 0.39
Rank Country Business Services Rank Country
Computer & Information 
Services
1 Angola 1.39 1 Luxembourg 1.60
2 Congo, Republic of 0.80 2 Moldova 1.43
3 Papua New Guinea 0.35 3 Guyana 1.19
4 Mozambique 0.33 4 Ireland 0.81
5 Ireland 0.28 5 Belgium 0.79
37 India 0.05 12 Germany 0.45
59 Germany 0.03 26 Russia 0.31
70 Russia 0.02 29 China, P.R. 0.27
78 China, P.R. 0.02 33 United Kingdom 0.23
80 France 0.02 53 France 0.11
90 United Kingdom 0.01 59 Japan 0.08
104 Japan 0.01 74 United States 0.02
115 United States 0.01
A. Ratio to Local GDP (%)
B. Ratio to Value-added of Local Service Sector (%)
1/  There is no separate information on computer and information services in the balance of payment' s of India.  
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
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Table 4.  Who Are the Biggest Absolute Insourcers (2002)? 
1/ 
 
Rank Country Business Services Rank Country
Computer & Information 
Services
1 United States 58,794 1 Ireland 10,426
2 United Kingdom 36,740 2 United Kingdom 5,675
3 Germany 27,907 3 United States 5,431
4 France 20,864 4 Germany 5,185
5 Netherlands 20,074 5 Spain 2,487
6 India 18,630 10 France 1,191
8 Japan 17,401 11 Japan 1,140
14 China, P.R. 10,419 12 China, P.R. 638
29 Russia 2,012 25 Russia 137




Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
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Table 5.  Who Are the Biggest Relative Insourcers, 2002? 
1/ 
 
Rank Economy Business Services Rank Economy
Computer & 
Information Services
1 Vanuatu 17.13 1 Ireland 8.54
2 Singapore 14.98 2 Cyprus 2.19
3 Hong Kong SAR 11.53 3 Luxembourg 1.09
4 Papua New Guinea 10.55 4 Costa Rica 0.91
5 Luxembourg 9.78 5 Belgium 0.76
21 India 3.79 17 United Kingdom 0.36
33 United Kingdom 2.35 24 Germany 0.26
50 France 1.45 42 France 0.08
54 Germany 1.40 49 United States 0.05
79 China, P.R. 0.82 51 China, P.R. 0.05
88 Russia 0.58 54 Russia 0.04
90 United States 0.56 59 Japan 0.03
95 Japan 0.44
Rank Economy Business Services Rank Economy
Computer & 
Information Services
1 Papua New Guinea 32.95 1 Ireland 15.64
2 Vanuatu 23.85 2 Guyana 1.50
3 Singapore 21.93 3 Costa Rica 1.46
4 Swaziland 16.06 4 Luxembourg 1.40
5 Hong Kong SAR 13.46 5 Armenia 1.09
13 India 7.82 18 United Kingdom 0.51
44 United Kingdom 3.28 24 Germany 0.38
53 China, P.R 2.45 38 China, P.R. 0.15
64 Germany 2.07 42 France 0.12
66 France 2.03 51 Russia 0.07
87 Russia 1.04 52 United States 0.07
91 United States 0.76 60 Japan 0.04
94 Japan 0.66
A. Ratio to Local GDP (%)
B. Ratio to Value-added of Local Service Sector (%)
1/  There is no separate information on computer and information services in the balance of payment' s of India.  
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
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Table 6.  Who Are the Biggest Surplus and Deficit Countries, 2002?
 1/ 
 
Rank Economy Business Services Rank Economy
Computer & 
Information Services Rank Economy Total
1 United Kingdom 20555.96 1 Ireland 9882.71 1 United Kingdom 23628.68
2 United States 17864.30 2 United States 3884.00 2 United States 21748.30
3 Hong Kong SAR 15424.54 3 United Kingdom 3072.72 3 Hong Kong SAR 15663.41
4 India 6813.44 4 Canada 1077.12 4 India 6813.44
5 Singapore 3826.12 5 Spain 914.65 5 Singapore 3826.12
6 China, P.R. 2462.05 15 France 41.39 9 China, P.R. 1967.20
10 France 1752.32 10 France 1793.70
135 Russia -2570.90 95 Russia -454.30 137 Russia -3025.20
139 Korea -4450.90 96 China, P.R. -494.85 139 Italy -4001.71
140 Japan -7313.51 97 Italy -674.85 140 Korea -4555.30
141 Indonesia -7985.71 98 Germany -939.29 141 Indonesia -7985.71
142 Germany -11205.43 99 Japan -1007.74 142 Japan -8321.25
143 Ireland -13882.01 100 Brazil -1118.10 143 Germany -12144.72
Surplus countries
Deficit countries
1/ Positive numbers in this table represent net insourcing of services (surplus), and negative numbers represent net outsourcing (deficit).
Surplus countries Surplus countries
Deficit countries Deficit countries
 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
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Rank of Service 
Outsourcing Growth
Top Five
Computer and related activities 144.0 1 5.2 58
Other transport equipment 73.9 2 72.6 8
Renting of machinery and equipment 52.9 3 17.1 39
Advertising 52.0 4 8.2 51
Television and radio transmitters 46.5 5 -9.5 68
Bottom Five
Preparation and spinning of textile fibers -47.0 74 100.2 4
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles -48.2 75 6.7 55
Wearing apparel; dressing and dying of fur -53.4 76 29.3 29
Finishing of textiles -54.0 77 -4.2 65















Rank of Service 
Outsourcing Growth
Top Five
Man-made fibers -38.9 73 185.8 1
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 3.8 30 132.5 2
Cement, lime and plaster -31.3 71 118.5 3
Preparation and spinning of textile fibers -47.0 74 100.2 4
Production and distribution of electricity -8.4 48 91.3 5
Bottom Five
Cutlery, tools and general hardware -6.9 46 -16.2 74
Building and repairing of ships and boats -5.2 43 -18.6 75
Sports goods, games and toys -23.7 61 -23.5 76
Machine tools -28.2 67 -28.3 77
Footwear -69.0 78 -46.1 78
1/ Industries in this study are aggregated into 84 sectors, which are based on SIC (92) 3-digit codes.
Table 7B.    Top Five and Bottom Five Sectors of Service Outsourcing Growth (UK, 1995-2001)
 
 
Sources: Employment data are from the Annual Employment Survey (AES, 1995-1997) and Annual Business 
Inquiry (ABI, 1998-2001). Service outsourcing ratios are calculated from input-output tables.  - 26 - 
Table 8A.  United Kingdom: Manufacturing Employment and Service Outsourcing, 1995-2001 
 
Dependent variable                ￿ln(employment)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿ ln (OSS)t 0.079* 0.128** 0.105** 0.104* 0.091 0.100
(0.048) (0.065) (0.047) (0.053) (0.077) (0.062)
￿ ln (OSS)t-1 0.063* 0.027 0.063*** -0.012 0.042 0.051
(0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.04) (0.054) (0.032)
￿ ln (OSS)t-2 -0.047 0.004 -0.068 0.011
(0.039) (0.02) (0.062) (0.044)
￿ ln (OSM)t -0.056 -0.094 -0.009 0.118 -0.346 -0.202
(0.157) (0.169) (0.111) (0.19) (0.241) (0.208)
￿ ln (OSM)t-1 -0.115 -0.132 0.043 -0.328** 0.233 0.276
(0.123) (0.139) (0.072) (0.128) (0.198) (0.179)
￿ ln (OSM)t-2 -0.346*** 0.034 -0.637*** -0.066
(0.129) (0.088) (0.155) (0.143)
￿ ln (wage)t -0.742*** -0.683***
(0.036) (0.048)
￿ ln (wage)t-1 0.069 0.052
(0.045) (0.09)
￿ ln (wage)t-2 0.081 0.112**
(0.07) (0.056)
￿ ln (real output)t 0.444*** 0.461***
(0.081) (0.13)
￿ ln (real output)t-1 0.254*** 0.193**
(0.067) (0.095)
￿ ln (real output)t-2 -0.028 0.043
(0.074) (0.097)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No No
N 345 276 256 276 207 192
R
2 0.12 0.18 0.76 0.14 0.17 0.72
Legend :  * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
One Period Difference Two Period Difference
 
 
Note:  In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over two periods i.e. Dx(t)=x(t)-x(t-2)   - 27 - 
Table 8B.  United Kingdom: Manufacturing Employment and Service Outsourcing–Sensitivity Tests, 
1995–2001 
 
Dependent   variable                ￿ln(employment)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿ ln (OSS)t 0.093 0.096** 0.096** 0.067 0.089* 0.120
(0.058) (0.043) (0.039) (0.07) (0.051) (0.077)
￿ ln (OSS)t-1 0.042* 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.038 0.001 0.038
(0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.049) (0.026) (0.032)
￿ ln (OSS)t-2 -0.005 -0.010 0.013 -0.020 -0.019 0.037
(0.025) (0.018) (0.021) (0.05) (0.035) (0.057)
￿ ln (OSM)t -0.168 0.006 -0.022 -0.338 -0.155 -0.13
(0.143) (0.102) (0.123) (0.248) (0.178) (0.193)
￿ ln (OSM)t-1 -0.078 0.023 -0.042 0.203 0.212 0.068
(0.089) (0.075) (0.101) (0.221) (0.158) (0.108)
￿ ln (OSM)t-2 -0.089 0.013 0.011 -0.343** -0.125 -0.054
(0.08) (0.085) (0.078) (0.166) (0.118) (0.147)
￿ ln (wage)t -0.790*** -0.753*** -0.847*** -0.766*** -0.692*** -0.799***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.065) (0.072) (0.045) (0.118)
￿ ln (wage)t-1 -0.003 0.249** -0.093** 0.055 0.557*** -0.059
(0.045) (0.105) (0.070) (0.103) (0.125) (0.058)
￿ ln (wage)t-2 0.018 0.075 -0.021 -0.032 0.085* -0.010
(0.074) (0.067) (0.048) (0.07) (0.047) (0.091)
￿ ln (real output)t 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.403*** 0.417**
(0.075) (0.081) (0.105) (0.16)
￿ ln (real output)t-1 0.161 0.337*** -0.054 0.304***
(0.072)** (0.111) (0.089) (0.086)
￿ ln (real output)t-2 -0.080 0.058 -0.104 0.117
(0.084) (0.060) (0.075) (0.121)
￿ ln (price) t 0.186 0.137
(0.278) (0.393)
￿ ln (price) t-1 -0.319 -0.531
(0.283) (0.664)
￿ ln (price) t-2 0.204 0.520
(0.152) (0.344)
￿ ln (employment)t-1 0.259** 0.716***
(0.112) (0.100)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
N 256 256 256 192 192 192
R
2 0.64 0.77 0.86 0.52 0.81 0.89
Legend :  * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
One Period Difference Two Period Difference
 
 
Note:  In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over two periods i.e., Dx(t)=x(t)-x(t-2)   - 28 - 
Table 9A.  United Kingdom: Service Sector Employment and Service Outsourcing, 1995–2001 
 
Dependent variable                ￿ln(employment)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿ ln (OSS)t -0.011 0.324 0.156 0.348 0.314 0.134
(0.328) (0.434) (0.215) (0.554) (0.816) (0.257)
￿ ln (OSS)t-1 -0.227 -0.138 -0.080 -0.455 -0.591 -0.170
(0.477) (0.53) (0.199) (0.43) (0.427) (0.137)
￿ ln (OSS)t-2 -0.133 0.354 0.567 0.858***
(0.306) (0.211) (0.698) (0.171)
￿ ln (OSM)t -0.036 0.485 -0.376* 0.216 0.221 -0.693**
(0.268) (0.456) (0.203) (0.562) (0.894) (0.242)
￿ ln (OSM)t-1 -0.180 -0.202 0.086 -0.472 0.007 0.431*
(0.329) (0.391) (0.234) (0.491) (0.938) (0.231)
￿ ln (OSM)t-2 -0.255 0.072 -0.408 0.041
(0.226) (0.167) (0.612) (0.204)
￿ ln (wage)t -0.939*** -0.975***
(0.069) (0.095)
￿ ln (wage)t-1 0.112 0.187
(0.083) (0.12)
￿ ln (wage)t-2 0.057 0.120
(0.068) (0.094)
￿ ln (nominal output)t 0.797*** 1.181***
(0.229) (0.268)
￿ ln (nominal output)t-1 0.141 -0.197
(0.226) (0.283)
￿ ln (nominal output)t-2 0.203 0.343*
(0.186) (0.17)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No No
N 45 36 36 36 27 27
R
2 0.24 0.28 0.91 0.14 0.33 0.95
Legend :  * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
One Period Difference Two Period Difference
 
 
Note:  In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over two periods i.e., Dx(t)=x(t)-x(t-2)   - 29 - 
Table  9B.   United Kingdom: Service Sector Employment and Service Outsourcing–Sensitivity Tests, 1995–2001 
Dependent variable                ￿ln(employment)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
￿ ln (OSS)t -0.169 -0.387 -0.45** -0.451
(0.263) (0.390) (0.183) (0.579)
￿ ln (OSS)t-1 -0.129 -0.674* -0.267** -0.783
(0.157) (0.332) (0.097) (0.476)
￿ ln (OSS)t-2 0.167 -0.257 0.472*** -0.023
(0.225) (0.320) (0.147) (0.577)
￿ ln (OSM)t -0.334* -0.686 -0.671*** -0.889
(0.177) (0.393) (0.177) (0.722)
￿ ln (OSM)t-1 0.248 -0.369 0.534*** -0.113
(0.188) (0.321) (0.168) (0.394)
￿ ln (OSM)t-2 0.093 -0.165 0.161 -0.669
(0.121) (0.285) (0.128) (0.824)
￿ ln (wage)t -0.864*** -0.952*** -0.861*** -0.806*
(0.073) (0.132) (0.067) (0.295)
￿ ln (wage)t-1 0.607** 0.060 0.833*** 0.202
(0.242) (0.133) (0.133) (0.228)
￿ ln (wage)t-2 -0.044 -0.002 -0.063 0.03
(0.074) (0.094) (0.054) (0.166)
￿ ln (nominal output)t 0.556** 0.257 0.630** -0.183
(0.238) (0.346) (0.206) (1.179)
￿ ln (nominal output)t-1 -0.211 -0.095 -0.455* -0.123
(0.21) (0.216) (0.22) (0.320)
￿ ln (nominal output)t-2 0.083 -0.166 0.115 -0.779
(0.162) (0.375) (0.117) (1.258)
￿ ln (employment)t-1 0.612** 0.815***
(0.29) (0.138)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
N 36 36 27 27
R
2 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.92
Legend :  * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
One Period Difference Two Period Difference
 
Note:  In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over two periods i.e., Dx(t)=x(t)-x(t-2)   - 30 - 
 
 











US news sources: Dow Jones News Service, Financial Times, The New York Times (Abstracts), The Seattle 
Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post.   - 31 - 
Figure 2.  United Kingdom: Outsourcing Intensity of Intermediate Inputs 
(Weighted Average Across All Industries by Outputs) 
Source: Input-Output Tables - United Kingdom National Accounts
             Imported Intermediate Manufacturing Input
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Variable  Source  Description/Notes 
Trade Data: imports and 
exports of computing and 
information services; and 
other business services 
IMF Balance of Payments, 
International Financial Statistics 
 




*   
Total compensation   
Output in current values 




**  Annual Employment survey (AES)  Great Britain, 
SIC92 3 digit, 1995-98 
  Annual Business Inquiry (ABI)  United Kingdom, 
SIC92 5 digit 1998-2001  
  Census of Employment, Northern 
Ireland 
Northern Ireland, 
1995 and 1997 
Price Indices





*  In order for the information from all sources to match, certain industries are aggregated together. The 
employment data from ABI are first aggregated into SIC92 3-digit level so as to match the categories of AES. A 
second stage of aggregation happens whenever there is a multiple-to-multiple correspondence between the I/O 
tables codes and the SIC92 3-digit codes. Finally, after dropping out industries which are either not of interest to 
this study, such as agriculture and mining sectors, or with incomplete information, we are left with 69 
manufacturing industries, and 9 service industries, listed below.  
 
** The regional coverage of the two sources of employment information are different. In order to make the two data 
comparable, the following steps were taken. First, the data for employment from Northern Ireland were added to 
employment data from Great Britain to get employment figures for United Kingdom for 1995-1997. Note, for 1996 
the employment in north Ireland is taken as a simple average of 1995 and 1997 employment. There still remain 
some industries for which there is no corresponding data in Northern Ireland. For these industries, the information 
of the overlapping year (1998) serves as a bridge to merge the whole series, with the employment of Great Britain 
industries assumed to be constant ratios of those of United Kingdom. 
 
***These  price  indices  are  available  at  different  levels  of  disaggregation  (SIC  92  classification)  and  do  not 
correspond to industries in our sample in a one-to-one fashion. Hence, we constructed a weighted average of these 
PPI (using average employment for the United Kingdom for the period 1998 to 2001as weights – the only years 
available at the appropriate level of disaggregation) to get price indices at 3 digit SIC level.   - 36 - 
Appendix II.  List of Industries in the U.K. Sample 
 
Manufacturing Industries - 
 
IO Industry Name IO Industry Name
  8 Meat processing   49 Glass and glass products
  9 Fish and fruit processing   50 Ceramic goods
  10 Oils and fats   51 Structural clay products
  11 Dairy products   52 Cement, lime and plaster
  12 Grain milling and starch   53 Articles of concrete, stone etc
  13 Animal feed   54 Iron and steel
  14 Bread, biscuits etc   55 Non-ferrous metals
  15 Sugar   56 Metal castings
  16 Confectionery   57 Structural metal products
  17 Other food products   58 Metal boilers and radiators
  18 Alcoholic beverages   59 Metal forging, pressing, etc
  19 Soft drinks and mineral waters   60 Cutlery, tools etc
  20 Tobacco products   61 Other metal products
  21 Textile fibres   62 Mechanical power equipment
  22 Textile weaving   63 General purpose machinery
  23 Textile finishing   64 Agricultural machinery
  24 Made-up textiles   65 Machine tools
  25 Carpets and rugs   66 Special purpose machinery
  26 Other textiles   67 Weapons and ammunition
  27 Knitted goods   68 Domestic appliances nec
  28 Wearing apparel and fur products   69 Office machinery & computers
  29 Leather goods   70 Electric motors and generators etc
  30 Footwear   71 Insulated wire and cable
  31 Wood and wood products   72 Electrical equipment nec
  32 Pulp, paper and paperboard   73 Electronic components
  33 Paper and paperboard products   74 Transmitters for TV, radio and phone
  34 Printing and publishing   75 Receivers for TV and radio
  36 Industrial gases and dyes   76 Medical and precision instruments
  37 Inorganic chemicals   77 Motor vehicles
  38 Organic chemicals   78 Shipbuilding and repair
  39 Fertilisers   79 Other transport equipment
  40 Plastics & synthetic resins etc   80 Aircraft and spacecraft
  41 Pesticides   81 Furniture
  42 Paints, varnishes, printing ink etc   82 Jewellery and related products
  43 Pharmaceuticals   83 Sports goods and toys
  44 Soap and toilet preparations   84 Miscellaneous manufacturing nec & recycling
  45 Other chemical products   85 Electricity production and distribution
  46 Man-made fibres   88 Construction
  47 Rubber products
  48 Plastic products Total Manufacturing Industries = 69  
 
Service Industries - 
 
IO Industry Name 108 Research and development
99 Telecommunications 109 Legal activities
100 Banking and finance 110 Accountancy services
101 Insurance and pension funds 111 Market research, management consultancy
102 Auxiliary financial services 112 Architectural activities and technical consultancy
106 Renting of machinery etc 113 Advertising
107 Computer services 114 Other business services
Total Service Industries = 9
Note:  Shading indicates industries that have been grouped together to match input/output classifications. 
Specifically, industries 14-17, 18-19, 25-26, 36-40, 100-102, and 109-111 are treated as 6 groups of industries.   - 37 - 
REFERENCES 
 
Amiti, Mary, 2004, “Location of Vertically Linked Industries: Agglomeration Versus 
Comparative Advantage,” European Economic Review, forthcoming. 
 
______, and Shang-Jin Wei, 2004, “Service Outsourcing, Productivity and Employment,” 
IMF Working Paper, forthcoming. 
 
Antras, Pol, 2003, “Firms, Contracts and Trade Structure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
  Vol. 118, pp. 1374–1418. 
 
______, and Elhanan Helpman, 2003, “Global Sourcing”, NBER Working Paper No. 10082,
  (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Borga, Maria, and William J. Zeile, 2004, “International Fragmentation of Production and 
the Intrafirm Trade of United States Multinational Companies,” WP2004–02, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. 
 
Brainard, Lael and Robert Litan, 2004, "Offshoring Service Jobs:  Bane or Boon and What to 
Do?” The Brookings Institution Policy Brief  No. 132. 
 
Campa, Jose and Linda S. Goldberg, 1997, “The Evolving External Orientation of 
Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from Four Countries”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 5919 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Council of Economic Advisors, 2004, Economic Report of the President. 
 
Deardorff, Alan V., 1998a, “Fragmentation in Simple Trade Models,” Research Seminar in 
International Economics Discussion Paper No. 422. 
 
_______, 1998b “Fragmentation Across Cones,” Research Seminar. International Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 427. 
 
Dixit, Avinash K. and Gene M. Grossman, 1982, “Trade and Protection with Multistage 
Production,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLIX(4), pp. 583–94. 
 
Egger, Hartmut and Peter Egger, 2001, “International Outsourcing and the Productivity of 
Low-Skilled Labour in the EU,” Working Paper 152/2001, Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research (WIFO) Vienna. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C., 2004, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy,” forthcoming. 
 
_______, and Gordon H. Hanson, 1996, “Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality” 
American Economic Review, Vol. LXXXVI, pp. 240–45. 
   - 38 - 
_______, 1997, “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages: Evidence from Mexico’s 
Maquiladoras,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 371–94. 
 
_______, 1999, “The Impact of Outsourcing and High Technology Capital on Wages: 
Estimates for the United States, 1979–1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics.,     
Vol. 114 (3), pp. 907–940. 
 
_______, 2001, “Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and 
Wages,” Handbook of International Trade. 
 
Gereffi, Gary, 1999, “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel 
Commodity Chain” Journal of International Economic, Vol. 48, pp. 37–70. 
 
Girma, Sourafel and Holger Gorg, 2003, “Outsourcing, Foreign Ownership and Productivity: 
Evidence from United Kingdom Establishment Level Data,” Discussion Paper 361, 
German Institute for Economic Research. 
 
Gorg Holger and Aoife Hanley, 2003, “International Outsourcing and Productivity: Evidence 
from Plant Level Data,” Research Paper 2003/20, University of Nottingham. 
 
Griliches, Zvi and Jerry A. Hausman, 1986, “Errors in Variables in Panel Data,” Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 31, pp. 93–118. 
 
Hamermesh, Daniel, 1993, “Labor Demand,” Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2004, “Vertical 
Production Networks in Multinational Firms” NBER Working Paper 9723 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts:  National Bureau of Economic Research) . 
 
Helpman, Elhanan, 1984, “A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational 
Corporations,” Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 92, pp. 451–72. 
 
Hijzen, Alexander, Holger Gorg and Robert C. Hine, 2002, “International Fragmentation and 
Relative Wages in the United Kingdom,” Research Paper 717 Bonn. 
 
Hummels, David, Ishii Jun and Kei-Mu Yi, 2001, “The Nature and Growth of Vertical 
Specialization in World Trade,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 54(1),   
pp. 75–96. 
 
Jones, Ronald and H Kierzkowski, 1990, “The Role of Services in Production and 
International Trade: A theoretical framework,” in Jones and Krueger (eds), The 
Political Economy of International Trade, Blackwell. 
 
 
   - 39 - 
______,1999, “Globalization and the Consequences of International Fragmentation,” in R. 
Dornbusch, G. Calvo and M.Obstfeld (eds), The Festschrift in Honor of Robert 
Mundell, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
______,2001, “A Framework for Fragmentation,” in Cheng and Kierzkowski (eds), 
Fragmentation and International Trade, Oxford University Press.  
 
Kirkegaard, Jacob F., 2004, “Outsourcing-Stains on the White Collar?” Institute of 
International Economics. 
 
Krugman, Paul, 1995, “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences,” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Vol. (1), pp. 327–62. 
 
_______, and Anthony J. Venables, 1995, “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, pp. 857–80. 
 
Mann, Catherine L., 2004, “Globalization of IT Services and White Collar Jobs: The Next 
Wave of Productivity Growth,” International Economics Policy Briefs 3–11.   
Institute of International Economics. 
 
Markusen, James, 2002, Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade. 
  Cambridge: MIT press. 
 
McKinsey Global Institute, 2003, “Offshoring: Is it a Win-Win Game?” San Francisco, 
www.mckinsey.com/knowledge/mgi/offshore. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Shang-Jin Wei, 2004, “The Non-Threat That is Outsourcing,” 
  Newspaper op-ed. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Howard J. Shatz, 1994, “Trade and Jobs in U.S. Manufacturing,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
Schultz, Charles, 2004, “Offshoring, Import Competition and Jobless Recovery,” Brookings 
  Brief. 
 
Slaughter, Matthew J., 2000, “Production Transfer Within Multinational Enterprises and 
American Wages,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 449–72. 
 
Ten Raa, Thijs and Edward N. Wolff, 2001, “Outsourcing of Services and the Productivity 
Recovery in United States Manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s” Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 16(2), pp. 149–65. 
 
Yeats, Alexander J., 2001, “Just How Big is Global Production Sharing?” in Arndt, S.W. and 
H.Kierzkowski (eds.) Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World 
Economy, Oxford University Press. 
   - 40 - 
Yi,  Kei-Mu.,  2003,  “Can  Vertical  Specialization  Explain  the  Growth  in  World  Trade?,” 
Journal of  Political Economy, Vol. 111(1), pp. 52–102. 
 
 